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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
In this Lanham Act case, plaintiff Checkpoint Systems, 
Inc. alleges Check Point Software Technologies, Inc. 
infringed on its trademark and engaged in unfair 
competition in violation of 15 U.S.C. SS 1114, 1125(a). 
Finding no likelihood of confusion between Checkpoint 
Systems's and Check Point Software's marks, the District 






Plaintiff Checkpoint Systems, Inc. has been 
manufacturing and distributing commercial electronic 
security control systems since 1967.1 Its devices are 
designed to track the physical location of goods and are 
sold to retailers to prevent merchandise theft. It is one of 
the two dominant manufacturers in the retail security 
products market. Since 1967 Checkpoint Systems has used 
the "CHECKPOINT" mark, which is registered with the 
United States Trademark office.2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Our recitation of the facts will be brief. A more detailed discussion 
may be found in the District Court opinion. Checkpoint Sys., Inc. v. 
Check Point Software Techs., Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 427 (D.N.J. 2000). 
 
2. Over thirty-three years of business, Checkpoint Systems has acquired 
several other companies and after each acquisition it has changed the 
marks of these companies to Checkpoint Systems. 
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Checkpoint Systems primarily sells four types of security 
monitoring devices: (1) electronic article surveillance 
systems; (2) access control systems; (3) closed circuit 
television systems; and (4) radio frequency identification 
devices. Its principal and most successful products are 
electronic article surveillance systems designed to alert 
retailers when items are removed from confined areas. 
Primarily used to prevent theft of merchandise from stores 
and books from libraries, these systems consist of circuited 
tags, electronic sensors, and deactivation equipment. The 
systems work by placing circuited tags on merchandise 
which are deactivated at the time of sale. If the tags are not 
deactivated, an alarm sounds. Electronic article 
surveillance systems cost between $2000 and $5000, plus 
the cost of individual tags. A large retail chain, including 
many of Checkpoint Systems's current clients, may spend 
over $20 million a year on this technology. 
 
Checkpoint Systems also manufactures electronic access 
control systems in the form of security cards that permit 
selected personnel to have access to restricted areas. 
Checkpoint Systems intends to use these electronic access 
control systems to make "smart cards" that will enable log- 
on access to computers and will facilitate monitoring of 
physical access to restricted areas. This product was in the 
development stage when this lawsuit commenced. 
 
Checkpoint Systems also sells closed circuit television 
systems that monitor activity within confined areas and 
transfer data to remote locations for employee audit and 
inventory management security teams. Although these 
systems currently transfer data and images over traditional 
telephone lines, Checkpoint Systems intends to transfer 
this data over customers' computer networks. These closed 
circuit products can be integrated with other computer 
systems, including other security application programs. 
 
In 1997, Checkpoint Systems began developing radio 
frequency identification devices with the view to creating 
"intelligent tags" for merchandise to carry information on 
"merchandise history." This radio technology would permit 
greater information storage than currently available on 
traditional bar code technology. These systems cost from 
$80,000 to $140,000. 
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The sale of electronic article surveillance systems to 
retail, industrial, institutional and government users 
comprises 90% of Checkpoint Systems's business. 
Revenues for article surveillance systems amounted to 
$365-380 million in 1999; revenues for access control 
systems were $15 million. Checkpoint Systems's electronic 
article surveillance systems have a 30% market share, but 
its systems dominate the drug store segment with a 70% 
market share. Its largest competitor is Sensormatic 
Electronic Corporation, which has a 45% share of the 
overall market. 
 
Checkpoint Systems promotes its products primarily 
through its direct sales force, trade shows, direct mailings 
to security systems dealers and its internet website. It 
spends $8 million annually on advertising and marketing. 
The trade shows in which it advertises are targeted to 
security professionals and retailers. Checkpoint Systems 
concentrates its print advertising in two magazines: Security3 
and Today's Facility Manager. 
 
The "CHECKPOINT" trademark is displayed prominently 
on all of Checkpoint Systems's products including all 
security tags, sensors, computer screens and access control 
cards. Checkpoint Systems is a public company whose 





Defendant Check Point Software Technologies, Inc. writes 
computer programs that protect and manage access to 
information. Check Point Software's principal product is 
"firewall" technology. Firewalls are computer systems that 
prevent unauthorized internal or external entry into 
computer networks. Check Point Software's firewall systems 
regulate data by acting as a screen between a business's 
private computer networks (intranets) and the wider 
Internet. These systems are sophisticated software 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Security magazine is marketed to security industry specialists and 
contains information about security hardware, security management and 
training issues, and information security. 
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applications that cost $2,999 for a single firewall and 
hundreds of thousands of dollars for more complicated 
systems. Check Point Software firewall products must be 
installed and maintained by computer network information 
specialists. 
 
At the time Check Point Software was founded in Israel 
in 1993, its founders were unaware of Checkpoint Systems. 
They adopted the "Check Point" mark because they believed 
their computer firewall technology, which limited access to 
data, resembled military check points that prevent access 
to restricted areas. 
 
Check Point Software is recognized as a leader in the 
firewall market with 40% of the worldwide market share. In 
1997, it expanded its product line beyond network security 
products to include "network management products." This 
software enables customers to design their own computer 
network security programs that can be integrated with 
Check Point Software programs. Check Point Software also 
sells "private networking software" which enables 
consumers to encrypt internal data so that outside users in 
the wider internet community will be unable to access this 
data when transmitted over unsecured public channels. 
 
In its promotional materials, Check Point Software 
markets itself as active in the corporate security industry. 
Its products are installed as a part of the overall network 
design or "architecture" of a business's computer system. 
They are not functional software applications that can be 
purchased by a consumer and installed at will. 
 
Check Point Software uses "Check Point" as its trade 
name. It has used this mark in several manifestations 
including, "CHECK POINT," "Checkpoint," and 
"CHECKPOINT." 
 
Check Point Software promotes its network security 
products through trade shows, direct advertising, 
educational seminars, and its web site. The trade shows 
and seminars in which it advertises are targeted to the 
Internet and computer network markets. These exhibitions 
do not include physical security manufacturers or their 
products. It also advertises in two widely circulated 
computer trade magazines, PC Week and Network World. 
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Its computer security programs are sold predominately to 
institutional and corporate clients. Check Point Software's 
principal competitors are computer companies like Cisco 
Systems and Network Associates. Check Point Software is a 
public company whose stock is traded on the NASDAQ 




In early 1996, Checkpoint Systems attempted to register 
the internet domain name www.checkpoint.com, but 
discovered it was registered by Check Point Software. After 
its request to discontinue use was rebuffed, Checkpoint 
Systems filed suit alleging trademark infringement and 
unfair competition under the Lanham Act. In a non-jury 
trial, the District Court held Check Point Software neither 
violated the Lanham Act nor infringed Checkpoint 
Systems's trademark. Examining likelihood of confusion, 
the District Court applied the factors enumerated in 
Interpace Corp. v. Lapp, Inc., 721 F.2d 460, 463 (3d Cir. 
1983), finding that only one factor--the strong similarity 
between the parties' marks--favored plaintiff Checkpoint 
Systems. With respect to the other Lapp factors, the court 
found the litigants operated in different and non-competing 
segments of the broad corporate security industry and that 
the level of consumer care in making purchasing decisions 
counseled against a finding of likely confusion. After 
determining the parties employed different marketing 
techniques in different industries, the court found there 
was no evidence that the two markets are converging. The 
court also found the few instances of misdirected 
correspondence and "minor degree of investor confusion" 
along with the failure to prove the existence of a single 
instance of a mistaken purchasing decision based on mark 
confusion weighed heavily against finding a Lanham Act 
violation. Additionally, the District Court held there was 
insufficient evidence of reverse confusion.4 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. As we discuss, reverse confusion occurs when"a larger, more powerful 
company uses the trademark of a smaller, less powerful senior owner 
and thereby causes likely confusion as to the source of the senior user's 
goods or services." Fisons Horticulture, Inc. v. Vigro Indus., Inc., 30 
F.3d 
466, 474 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats 
Co., 978 F.2d 947 (7th Cir. 1992)). 
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In this appeal, Checkpoint Systems contends the District 
Court improperly evaluated the Lapp factors in its 
likelihood of confusion analysis. In particular, Checkpoint 
Systems argues the District Court improperly required 
evidence of actual consumer confusion at the point of sale 





The District Court had jurisdiction over plaintiff 's 
Lanham Act claims under 28 U.S.C. SS 1331, 1338(a) and 
15 U.S.C. S 1051 et seq. We have jurisdiction over the final 
judgment of the District Court under 28 U.S.C. S 1291. We 
exercise plenary review over the District Court's legal 
conclusions concerning the Lanham Act. Express Servs., 
Inc. v. Careers Express Staffing Servs., 176 F.3d 183, 185 
(3d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1052 (2000). We 
review factual findings on the likelihood of confusion for 
clear error. A&H Sportswear Inc. v. Victoria's Secret Stores, 




Checkpoint Systems alleges Check Point Software 
engaged in unfair competition and trademark infringement 
in violation SS 32 and 43(a) of the Lanham Act when it 
adopted the Checkpoint mark.5 To prove trademark 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Section 32 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. S 1114, provides: 
 
(1) Any person who shall, without consent of the registrant-- 
 
       (a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or 
colorable 
       imitation of a registered mark in connection with the sale, 
offering 
       for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on 
or 
       in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion . . 
. . 
 
       *  *  * 
 
       shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant . . . . 
 
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. S 1125, provides: 
 
       (a)(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or 
       services . . . uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or 
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infringement and unfair competition under the Lanham 
Act, Checkpoint Systems must prove: (1) it owns the 
Checkpoint mark; (2) the mark is valid and legally 
protectable; and (3) Check Point Software's use of the mark 
to identify goods or services is likely to create confusion. 
Commerce Nat'l Ins. Servs., Inc. v. Commerce Ins. Agency, 
Inc., 214 F.3d 432, 437-38 (3d Cir. 2000). Neither party 
disputes the first two elements.6 The issue on appeal is 
whether Check Point Software's use of the "CHECKPOINT" 
mark is likely to create confusion as to the source of the 
parties' products.7  Lapp, 721 F.2d at 462 ("The law of 
trademark protects trademark owners in the exclusive use 
of their marks when use by another would be likely to 
cause confusion."). To prove likelihood of confusion, 
plaintiffs must show that "consumers viewing the mark 
would probably assume the product or service it represents 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of 
       origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or 
misleading 
       representation of fact, which-- 
 
       (A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to 
deceive as 
       to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with 
       another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of 
his 
       or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person 
       . . . 
 
       *  *  * 
 
       shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that 
he 
       or she is is likely to be damaged by such act. 
 
6. In Commerce Nat'l Ins. Servs., Inc., we held, "[I]f the mark at issue 
is 
federally registered and has become incontestable, then validity, legal 
protectability and ownership are proved." 214 F.3d at 438 (citing Ford 
Motor Co. v. Summit Motor Prods., 930 F.2d 277, 292 (3d Cir. 1991)). 
Checkpoint Systems's mark has been registered and continuously used 
for five consecutive years and there are no pending proceedings 
contesting Checkpoint Systems's ownership of the mark. The 
"Checkpoint" mark is therefore valid and incontestable. Fisons, 30 F.3d 
at 472 n.7. 
 
7. As we recently held in A&H Sportswear, the relevant inquiry is not 
whether consumer confusion is a "possibility," but whether confusion is 
"likely." 237 F.3d at 198; see also Opticians Ass'n of Am. v. Indep. 
Opticians of Am., 920 F.2d 187, 195 (3d Cir. 1990) ("Proof of actual 
confusion is not necessary; likelihood is all that need be shown."). 
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is associated with the source of a different product or 
service identified by a similar mark." Scott Paper Co. v. 
Scott's Liquid Gold, Inc., 589 F.2d 1225, 1229 (3d Cir. 
1978). In Interpace Corp. v. Lapp, Inc., 721 F.2d 460, 463 
(3d Cir. 1983), we set forth the relevant standards on 
likelihood of confusion in noncompeting goods cases, 8 
commonly known as the Lapp factors: 
 
       (1) [The] degree of similarity between the o wner's mark 
       and the alleged infringing mark; 
 
       (2) the strength of the owner's mark; 
 
       (3) the price of the goods and other factors indic ative of 
       the care and attention expected of consumers when 
       making a purchase; 
 
       (4) the length of time the defendant has used the mark 
       without evidence of actual confusion; 
 
       (5) the intent of the defendant in adopting the ma rk; 
 
       (6) the evidence of actual confusion; 
 
       (7) whether the goods, though not competing, are 
       marketed through the same channels of trade and 
       advertised through the same media; 
 
       (8) the extent to which the targets of the parties ' sales 
       efforts are the same; 
 
       (9) the relationship of the goods in the minds of 
       consumers because of the similarity of functions; and 
 
       (10) other facts suggesting that the consuming pub lic 
       might expect the prior owner to manufacture a product 
       in the defendant's market or that he is likely to expand 
       into that market. 
 
None of these factors is determinative in the likelihood of 
confusion analysis and each factor must be weighed and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. The multi-factor test used to determine likelihood of confusion 
between noncompeting goods should also be applied in cases involving 
directly competing goods. A&H Sportswear, 237 F.3d at 207 ("[W]e 
conclude that the factors we have developed in the noncompeting goods 
context are helpful tools and should be used to aid in the determination 
of the likelihood of confusion in other cases."). 
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balanced one against the other. Fisons, 30 F.3d at 473 
("[N]ot . . all factors must be given equal weight. The weight 
given to each factor in the overall picture, as well as the 
weighing for plaintiff or defendant, must be done on an 
individual fact-specific basis."); see also A&H Sportswear, 
237 F.3d at 215 ("[T]he Lapp test is a qualitative inquiry. 
Not all factors will be relevant in all cases; further, the 
different factors may properly be accorded different weights 
depending on the particular factual setting."). We stated, 
 
       [W]here the plaintiff and defendant deal in non- 
       competing goods or services, the court must look 
       beyond the trademark to the nature of the products 
       themselves, and to the context in which they are 
       marketed and sold. The closer the relationship between 
       the products, and the more similar their sales contexts, 
       the greater the likelihood of confusion. 
 
Fisons, 30 F.3d at 473. 
 
As noted, the District Court applied the appropriate Lapp 
factors to find there was no likelihood of confusion. We will 
address the District Court's application of each factor.9 
 
A. Similarity of Marks -- Lapp Factor (1) 
 
Although the degree of similarity between the owner's 
mark and the alleged infringing mark is but one factor in 
the multi-factor confusion analysis, we have recognized that 
when products directly compete, mark similarity"may be 
the most important of the ten factors in Lapp ." Fisons, 30 
F.3d at 476; see also A&H Sportswear, 237 F.3d at 216 
("The single most important factor in determining likelihood 
of confusion is mark similarity."). As we held in Versa 
Prods. Co. v. Bifold Co. (Mfg.), 50 F.3d 189, 202 (3d Cir. 
1995), "unless the allegedly infringing mark . . . is 
substantially similar to the protectable mark . . ., it is 
highly unlikely that consumers will confuse the product 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. Our analysis follows a somewhat different sequence than that 
employed in Lapp. The sequence specified in Lapp is not necessary to the 
likelihood-of-confusion analysis, and we have found that a slightly 
different order better facilitates the analysis of the particular issues 
presented by this case. 
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sources represented by the different marks.""[I]f the overall 
impression created by marks is essentially the same,`it is 
very probable that the marks are confusingly similar.' " 
Opticians Assn. of Am., 920 F.2d at 195 (quoting J. Thomas 
McCarthy, 2 McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair 
Competition, S 23:7 (2d ed. 1984)). In applying this test, 
courts attempt to "move into the mind of the roving 
consumer," A&H Sportswear, 237 F.3d at 216, and 
determine "whether the labels create the same overall 
impression when viewed separately." Fisons , 30 F.3d at 
476; see also Banff, Ltd. v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 841 
F.2d 486, 492 (2d Cir. 1988). Courts must "compare the 
appearance, sound and meaning of the marks," Harlem 
Wizards Entm't. Basketball, Inc. v. NBA Props., Inc. , 952 F. 
Supp. 1084, 1096 (D.N.J. 1997), to determine whether the 
"average consumer, on encountering one mark in isolated 
circumstances of marketplace and having only [a] general 
recollection of the other, would likely confuse or associate 
the two." Fisons, 30 F.3d at 477-78. 
 
Here, the District Court found Check Point Software's 
mark was very similar to Checkpoint Systems's mark. The 
court noted that "[w]hen the dominant portions of the two 
marks are the same and the overall impression created by 
the marks is essentially the same `it is very probable that 
the marks are confusingly similar.' " Checkpoint Sys., 104 
F. Supp. 2d at 457-58 (quoting Opticians Assn. of Am., 920 
F.2d at 195). The court found the dominant portion of each 
parties' trademark is the word "Checkpoint." Even though 
Check Point Software has at times used the mark in 
slightly different forms including, "Checkpoint," 
"CheckPoint," or "Check Point," the dominant features of its 
mark are still the words "check" and "point." Additionally 
because "Systems," "Software," "Technologies," and "Inc.," 
are generic or descriptive terms, the District Court found 
their addition to the dominant terms "check" and "point" 
would not lead the average consumer to disassociate the 
products. J. Thomas McCarthy, 3 McCarthy on Trademarks 
and Unfair Competition, S 23:50 (4th ed. 2000) ("The 
Trademark Board has said that the general rule is that a 
subsequent user may not avoid likely confusion by 
appropriating another's entire mark and adding descriptive 
or non-descriptive matter to it."). We agree. The District 
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Court did not clearly err in finding the overall commercial 
impression of the parties' marks was confusingly similar. 
 
On appeal, Checkpoint Systems contends the District 
Court ignored its finding of mark similarity when it 
ultimately determined there was no likelihood of confusion. 
But mark similarity is not necessarily determinative of 
likely confusion, particularly when the products do not 
directly compete. A&H Sportswear, 237 F.3d at 214 
("[W]hen the marks directly compete . . . the factor 
regarding the similarity of marks may increase in 
importance, but it does not eliminate the other factors 
entirely."); Fisons, 30 F.3d at 473 ("Where the goods or 
services are not competing the similarity of the marks is 
only one of a number of factors the court must examine to 
determine likelihood of confusion."). Here, the District 
Court determined that in weighing all the Lapp  factors, 
there was not a strong likelihood of confusion. We see no 
error. 
 
B. Strength of Mark -- Lapp Factor (2)  
 
Courts have recognized that 
 
       [a] strong trademark is . . . one that carries 
       widespread, immediate recognition that one producer 
       (even if unknown) is associated with the mark, and so 
       with the product. If a second comer adopts a mark 
       substantially identical to a strong mark, there is a 
       correspondingly high likelihood that consumers will 
       mistakenly associate the newcomer's product with the 
       owner of the strong mark. 
 
Versa Prods., 50 F.3d at 203. 
 
The strength of a mark is determined by (1) the 
distinctiveness or conceptual strength of the mark and (2) 
its commercial strength or marketplace recognition. Fisons, 
30 F.3d at 478-79. Under distinctiveness, we look at the 
inherent features of the mark. Trademarks protected under 
the Lanham Act are divided into four categories: 
 
        [1] arbitrary or fanciful marks [that] use terms that 
       neither describe nor suggest anything about the 
       product; they "bear no logical or suggestive relation to 
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       the actual characteristics of the goods." [2] Suggestive 
       marks [that] require consumer "imagination, thought 
       or perception" to determine what the product is.[3] 
       Descriptive terms [that] "forthwith convey[ ] an 
       immediate idea of the ingredients, qualities or 
       characteristics of the goods" [and] [4] generic marks 
       . . . that "function as the common descriptive name of 
       a product class." 
 
A&H Sportswear, 237 F.3d at 221-22(quoting A.J. Canfield 
Co. v. Honickman, 808 F.2d 291, 296-97 (3d Cir. 1986)). 
 
In Ford Motor Co., we further explained the categorization 
of marks stating, 
 
       Arbitrary marks are "those words, symbols, pictures, 
       etc., which are in common linguistic use but which, 
       when used with the goods or services in issue, neither 
       suggest nor describe any ingredient, quality or 
       characteristic of those goods or services." . . . 
       Suggestive marks are virtually indistinguishable from 
       arbitrary marks, but have been defined as marks 
       which suggest a quality or ingredient of goods . . .. A 
       mark is considered descriptive if it describes the 
       "intended purpose, function, or use of the goods; of the 
       size of the goods, of the class of users of the goods, or 
       of the end effect upon the user." 
 
930 F.2d at 292 n.18 (quoting 1 McCarthy, Trademarks 
and Unfair Competition at S11:3-5, 20). 
 
While generic marks do not receive trademark protection, 
arbitrary, suggestive and descriptive marks with a 
demonstrated secondary meaning10 are entitled to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. But marks that are merely descriptive (without a secondary meaning) 
are generally weak and not entitled to strong protection. A mark is 
descriptive with a secondary meaning when the mark 
 
       "is interpreted by the consuming public to be not only an 
       identification of the product or services, but also a 
representation of 
       the origin of those products of services." In general [a secondary 
       meaning] is established through extensive advertising which creates 
       in the minds of consumers an association between the mark and the 
       provider of the services advertised under the mark. 
 





The District Court found Checkpoint Systems's mark was 
either suggestive or descriptive with a secondary meaning 
within the electronic article surveillance market. We see no 
error. The mark is suggestive to the extent it requires 
consumer imagination to determine that Checkpoint 
Systems's security products serve as "check points" to 
prevent unauthorized access and theft of merchandise. But 
the mark is descriptive insofar as its products serve as 
checkpoints. That is, they occupy a point at which 
customers are checked for stolen merchandise or people are 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Commerce Nat'l Ins. Serv. Inc., 214 F.3d at 438 (quoting Scott Paper Co., 
589 F.2d at 1228); see also Ford Motor Co., 930 F.2d at 292 (listing a 
"non-exclusive list of factors which may be considered [in determining 
whether a mark has achieved a secondary meaning,] includ[ing] the 
extent of sales and advertising leading to buyer association, length of 
use, exclusivity of use, the fact of copying, customer surveys, customer 
testimony, the use of the mark in trade journals, the size of the 
company, the number of sales, the number of customers, and actual 
confusion."); Charles Jacquin Et Cie, Inc. v. Destileria Serralles, Inc., 
921 
F.2d 467, 476 (3d Cir. 1990) ("While consumer surveys are useful, and 
indeed the most direct method of demonstrating secondary meaning and 
likelihood of confusion, they are not essential where, as here, other 
evidence exists."). 
 
11. In A&H Sportswear, we recently held, 
 
       Although the conceptual strength of a mark is often associated with 
       the particular category of "distinctiveness" into which a mark 
falls 
       (i.e., arbitrary, suggestive, or descriptive), that is not the only 
       measure of conceptual strength. This is because the classification 
       system's primary purpose is to determine whether the mark is 
       protectable as a trademark in the first place--that is, to 
determine 
       whether consumers are likely to perceive the mark as a signifier of 
       origin, rather than as a mere identification of the type of 
product. 
       The classification of a mark as arbitrary, suggestive, or 
descriptive 
       is [also] . . . used to determine the degree of protection a mark 
       should receive once protectability has been established. These two 
       inquiries--whether a mark is, in fact, a trademark, versus how 
       much protection the mark should receive--are often identical, but 
       they do not have to be. 
 
237 F.3d at 222. 
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checked for authorization to access restricted areas. In 
either event, the mark has achieved a strong secondary 
meaning in the physical article security market. Checkpoint 
Systems has spent millions of dollars in advertising its 
physical article security systems and the mark has 
achieved high recognition among consumers in this market. 
The District Court was therefore correct in stating, 
"Checkpoint [Systems] has used its name and mark in 
connection with its electronic article surveillance products 
for more than thirty years continuously, extensively, and in 
a substantially exclusive manner, and that long use 
renders the mark strong within the physical surveillance 
field." Checkpoint Sys., 104 F. Supp. 2d at 458. 
 
The mark has not, however, attained a strong secondary 
meaning in other segments of the corporate security 
market, particularly in the information technology market. 
There is no evidence that Checkpoint Systems spent a 
substantial amount of resources in advertising in this 
market, nor is there any evidence that Checkpoint Systems 
has achieved mark recognition in this segment of the  
industry.12 Because Checkpoint Systems's descriptive mark 
has not attained a secondary meaning within the 
information technology market, it is not conceptually strong 
within this sector of the corporate security market. The 
District Court found that Checkpoint Systems's mark"may 
be strong, but that strength does not appear to extend 
beyond its own subfield of physical security with respect to 
electronic article surveillance." 104 F. Supp. 2d at 460. 
This finding is adequately supported in the record. 
Although Checkpoint Systems manufactured other 
products aside from physical article surveillance systems, 
the court found these products constituted a very small 
portion of its business. Its mark was not readily 
recognizable by consumers outside the electronic article 
surveillance market and there is "no evidence that any 
witness from the information security field had ever heard 
of [Checkpoint Systems]." Id. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. As the District Court noted, Checkpoint Systems "did not present 
any evidence of a customer survey indicating [its] marks' strength, and 
thus there is no direct evidence probative of customer views." 104 F. 
Supp. 2d at 460. ` 
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Plaintiffs claim the District Court erred in its commercial 
strength analysis because it undervalued the overwhelming 
strength of the Checkpoint Systems mark in the article 
surveillance market. But the District Court held, properly 
in our view, that courts must look at the strength of the 
mark in the industry in which infringement is alleged. See, 
e.g., Homeowners Group, Inc., 931 F.2d at 1107-08 ("[A 
mark] may . . . have high recognition which is limited to a 
particular product or market segment."); Mead Data Cent., 
Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 1026, 1031 
(2d Cir. 1989) (luxury car maker could not demonstrate 
that its powerful mark extended to the completely unrelated 
market of legal research tools); IDV N. Am., Inc. v. S&M 
Brands, Inc., 26 F. Supp. 2d 815, 824 (E.D.Va. 1998) ("A 
mark may be strong in the market in which it is used but 
weak in another market in which it is not used."). Here, the 
alleged infringement extends beyond the physical article 
security field into other, broader segments of the security 
industry, including computer security. The District Court 
did not clearly err in finding that Checkpoint Systems's 
mark's strength was limited to the physical article security 
market. Because the mark was not strong in the network 
access security market, it was not entitled to heightened 
protection within that market. 
 
C. Factors Indicative of the Care and Sophistication of 
Purchasers -- Lapp Factor (3) 
 
When consumers exercise heightened care in evaluating 
the relevant products before making purchasing decisions, 
courts have found there is not a strong likelihood of 
confusion. Where the relevant products are expensive, or 
the buyer class consists of sophisticated or professional 
purchasers, courts have generally not found Lanham Act 
violations. Versa Prods., 50 F.3d at 204 ("Inexpensive goods 
require consumers to exercise less care in their selection 
than expensive ones. The more important the use of the 
product, the more care that must be exercised in its 
selection."). As a leading treatise notes, 
 
       Obviously, the price level of the goods or services is an 
       important factor in determining the amount of care the 
       reasonably prudent buyer will use. If the goods or 
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       services are relatively expensive, more care is taken 
       and buyers are less likely to be confused as to source 
       or affiliation. 
 
3 McCarthy on Trademarks, S 23:95; see also Astra Pharm. 
Prods., Inc. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 718 F.2d 1201, 
1206-07 (1st Cir. 1983) (expensive health care equipment 
elevated concern of purchasers). Similarly, 
 
       [w]here the relevant buyer class is composed solely of 
       professional, or commercial purchasers, it is 
       reasonable to set a higher standard of care than exists 
       for consumers. Many cases state that where the 
       relevant buyer class is composed of professionals or 
       commercial buyers familiar with the field, they are 
       sophisticated enough not to be confused by trademarks 
       that are closely similar. That is, it is assumed that 
       such professional buyers are less likely to be confused 
       than the ordinary consumer. 
 
3 McCarthy on Trademarks, S 23:101; see also Ford Motor 
Co., 930 F.2d at 293 ("Professional buyers, or consumers of 
very expensive goods, will be held to a higher standard of 
care."); Perini Corp. v. Perini Constr., Inc. , 915 F.2d 121, 128 
(4th Cir. 1990) ("[I]n a market with extremely sophisticated 
buyers, the likelihood of consumer confusion cannot be 
presumed on the basis of the similarity in trade name 
alone."); Oreck Corp. v. U.S. Floor Sys., Inc., 803 F.2d 166, 
173-74 (5th Cir. 1986) (business purchasers of expensive 
products not likely to confuse goods with similar marks). 
 
When the purchasing class is mixed, courts normally do 
not hold the general class to a high standard of care. Ford 
Motor Co., 930 F.2d at 293 ("When the buyer class is 
mixed, the standard of care to be exercised by the 
reasonably prudent purchaser will be equal to that of the 
least sophisticated consumer in the class."). If there is 
evidence that both average consumers and specialized 
commercial purchasers buy goods, there is a lower 
standard of care because of the lack of sophistication of 
some of the relevant purchasers. Id. ("Where the buyer 
class `consists of both professional buyers and consumers 
then the issue will center on the consumers, for confusion 
within the lowest stratum of reasonably prudent buyers 
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may give rise to liability even if professional buyers in the 
market are not confused.' ") (quoting Worthington Foods, 
Inc. v. Kellogg Co., 732 F. Supp. 1417, 1488 (S.D. Ohio 
1990)). 
 
Evaluating the care and sophistication exercised by 
consumers of Checkpoint Systems's and Check Point 
Software's products, the District Court found, 
 
       [B]oth plaintiff 's products and defendant's products 
       are expensive. The purchasers of these respective 
       products are, for the most part, highly sophisticated, 
       and the sale process is lengthy . . . . Plaintiff 's and 
       defendant's products are not impulse purchases, but 
       rather are subject to long sales efforts and careful 
       customer decision making. 
 
Checkpoint Sys., 104 F. Supp. 2d at 460. 
 
We agree. The consumers of Checkpoint Systems's and 
Check Point Software's products place great importance on, 
and take great care in, purchasing these products. 
Checkpoint Systems's consumers exercise a heightened 
standard of care in their purchasing decisions because they 
need to ensure the article surveillance equipment can be 
quickly and easily repaired and is readily available for new 
merchandise. Similarly, purchasers of Check Point 
Software's firewall technology are highly technical computer 
and information specialists that must ensure the software 
is compatible with other programs.13 Because the security 
provided is integral to loss prevention in the one case, and 
confidentiality of communications in the other, the 
products here are essential to the customers' business 
needs. Because of the respective products' importance to 
their buyers' security needs and their high cost, consumers 
take care in making purchasing decisions and are not likely 
to be confused by the parties' similar marks. 
 
Checkpoint Systems contends that not all the relevant 
consumers are sophisticated purchasers and that many 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. Although in its marketing materials Check Point Software states that 
its firewall technology is "designed to be easily installed, configured, 
and 
managed," maintaining this equipment requires specialized expertise 
beyond the knowledge of mere technically proficient computer users. 
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"mom and pop stores," which exercise a lower standard of 
care, purchase both parties' products. The District Court 
acknowledged these smaller commercial purchasers were 
part of the relevant consumer class and adjusted its 
evaluation of consumer sophistication accordingly. Because 
the systems are expensive and require on-going 
maintenance, the court found these smaller commercial 
consumers view the purchase of both parties' products as 
an important investment decision. The court also noted 
that many small businesses turn to outside experts to 
assist in the purchase of complicated computer and article 
surveillance systems. Additionally, only computer 
specialists with significant training can install and make 
informed purchasing decisions about Check Point 
Software's complicated firewall technology. Furthermore, 
expert witnesses testified that smaller "mom and pop 
stores" would likely not have need for the complicated 
security software manufactured by Check Point Software. 
 
The District Court properly evaluated the care exercised 
by consumers of these products in making purchasing 
decisions. The evidence supports the finding that the 
purchase of both parties' products involve a significant 
investment and even smaller commercial consumers 
exercise a heightened degree of care in evaluating the 
products and making purchasing decisions. We see no clear 
error. 
 
D. Intent of the Defendant in Adopting the Mark-- 
Lapp Factor (5) 
 
While evidence of a party's intentional use of another 
party's mark to cause confusion is not a prerequisite to 
proving a Lanham Act violation, see generally Lois 
Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 
867, 875 (2d Cir. 1986), courts have recognized that 
evidence of "intentional, willful and admitted adoption of a 
mark closely similar to the existing marks" weighs strongly 
in favor of finding the likelihood of confusion. National 
Football League Props., Inc. v. New Jersey Giants, Inc., 637 
F. Supp. 507, 518 (D.N.J. 1986). Here, the District Court 
found, "[t]here is no evidence or even inference that 
defendant chose its name with plaintiff 's name or products 
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in mind." Checkpoint Sys., 104 F. Supp. 2d at 465. We 
agree. 
 
E. Relationship of goods in the minds of consumers 
because of the similarity of product functions -- 
Lapp Factor (7) 
 
Under this prong, courts examine whether buyers and 
users of each parties' goods are likely to encounter the 
goods of the other, creating an assumption of common 
source affiliation or sponsorship. Fisons, 30 F.3d at 481 
("The question is whether the consumer might . . . 
reasonably conclude that one company would offer both of 
these related products."). The test is whether the goods are 
similar enough that a customer would assume they were 
offered by the same source. Wynn Oil Co. v. Thomas, 839 
F.2d 1183, 1187 (6th Cir. 1988). 
 
Checkpoint Systems contends that both parties operate 
in the overlapping business of corporate security. While 
each serves a different branch of this broad industry (i.e., 
Checkpoint Systems primarily focuses on physical security 
while Check Point Software focuses on information and 
computer security), each is a smaller piece in the overall 
corporate security industry. Checkpoint Systems contends 
that in the increasingly technical and sophisticated 
business world, a reasonable business consumer might 
believe that Checkpoint Systems, who had developed a 
niche in physical article security, had expanded into the 
computer technology market. See Dreamwerks Prod. Group, 
Inc. v. SKG Studio, 142 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 1998) 
("[R]elatedness of each company's prime directive isn't 
relevant. Rather, we must focus on [plaintiff 's] customers 
and ask whether they are likely to associate the[plaintiff 's 
products] with [the defendant]."). Checkpoint Systems 
argues the increasing awareness among security 
professionals of both physical and computer information 
security systems has led professionals to be cognizant of 
both companies' products. 
 
Checkpoint Systems also contends it has developed 
integrated circuit technology in its radio frequency and 
closed circuit television products that allow consumers to 
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link Checkpoint Systems hardware with their computer 
systems. It argues these physical security products employ 
secure information lines similar to the firewall products 
that Check Point Software manufactures.14  On the basis of 
these products, it contends its physical security products 
overlap with computer and information security products 
making consumers likely to associate Checkpoint Systems's 
mark with Check Point Software's mark.15  
 
But the District Court found the parties 
 
       operate in separate and distinct segments of the overall 
       field of corporate security. Plaintiff 's sphere includes 
       physical security and control of flow of corporate goods 
       and people . . . . Defendant's sphere includes electronic 
       information security on computer networks at the point 
       of connection to the Internet and within the customer's 
       intranet. Their products are not substitutes for each 
       other. . . . [Their products] are advertised in different 
       magazines and are promoted in entirely different trade 
       shows. 
 




14. Checkpoint Systems contends its business has expanded beyond 
article surveillance into "electronic access control" products that help 
limit access to physical areas where computer software is located. It also 
points to its smart card technology that links computer networking to 
physical security. 
 
15. Checkpoint Systems also argues that Check Point Software's firewall 
systems can be linked with other security systems, including some of the 
article surveillance products that Checkpoint Systems manufactures. It 
contends this integration technology is evidence that the computer 
software industry is moving into the area of physical security by allowing 
integration with physical security products. But the mere fact that 
software technology can be integrated with other technology, including 
but not limited to physical security technology, is not necessarily proof 
that the manufacturer of software technology is moving into broader 
security realms. By developing technology that can be integrated with 
other products, Check Point Software allows consumers to choose among 
various "speciality" programs that it wants to include in its system. It 
does not necessarily mean that Check Point Software has itself moved 
into the market of these "speciality" security programs. 
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       That there is no overlap in the places these parties 
       market their products tends to diminish the chance 
       that someone who is a specialist in network security 
       will even come across an advertisement for plaintiff, 




The District Court did not clearly err. The "relatedness" 
analysis is intensely factual. Goods may fall under the 
same general product category but operate in distinct 
niches. When two products are part of distinct sectors of a 
broad product category, they can be sufficiently unrelated 
that consumers are not likely to assume the products 
originate from the same mark. See, e.g., Commerce Nat'l 
Ins. Servs., Inc., 214 F.3d at 441 (holding marks held by 
company operating in banking industry and company 
operating in insurance industry did not create consumer 
confusion because the two companies were involved in 
distinct highly regulated industries); Astra Pharm. Prods., 
718 F.2d at 1207 (finding no product similarity in medical 
technology sold to different departments in hospital 
because " `the hospital community' is not a homogeneous 
whole, but is composed of separate departments with 
diverse purchasing requirements, which, in effect, 
constitute different markets for the parties' respective 
products."); Harlem Wizards, 952 F. Supp. at 1095 (finding 
no product similarity between professional competitive 
basketball team and "show basketball" team). 16 
 
The District Court held that Checkpoint Systems's 
products are simply different from Check Point Software's 
products. While Checkpoint Systems's access control, 
closed circuit television and radio frequency products may 
employ similar technology, their purpose is physical article 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
16. Products sold and marketed in the computer and information 
technology industry can be sufficiently distinct that they do not lead to 
likely consumer confusion. See, e.g., Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue Computing, 
Inc., 
232 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (computer game and computer 
consulting service not similar); but see Lambda Elecs. Corp. v. Lambda 
Tech., Inc., 515 F. Supp. 915, 926 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (finding "moderate 
product proximity" between computer software and computer hardware 
because both products are "intended to function in computers"). 
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surveillance or personal access. On the other hand, Check 
Point Software's firewall technology is not intended to 
prevent theft of merchandise or limit physical access. Its 
purpose is to prevent third parties from accessing 
information from unsecure computer lines. Because the 
products serve different functions, and there is only 
"minimal overlap" in the product technology, it is unlikely 
consumers would be confused by the similar marks. 17 
Fisons, 30 F.3d at 481. The District Court did not clearly 
err in its application of the product similarity prong of the 
confusion analysis. See, e.g., Nutri/System, Inc. v. Con-Stan 
Indus., 809 F.2d 601, 606 (9th Cir. 1987) (weight loss 
centers and weight loss counseling differed in methods, 
customer groups and facilities); Plus Prods. v. Plus Disc. 
Foods, Inc., 722 F.2d 999, 1008 (2d Cir. 1983) (bargain food 
and health food were not so similar as to create likelihood 
of confusion). 
 
F. The extent to which the parties' goods are 
marketed through the same channels of trade -- Lapp 
Factor (9) 
 
Courts have recognized that "the greater the similarity in 
advertising and marketing campaigns, the greater the 
likelihood of confusion." Acxiom Corp. v. Axiom, Inc., 27 F. 
Supp. 2d 478, 502 (D. Del. 1998). Applying this factor, 
courts must examine the trade exhibitions, publications 
and other media the parties use in marketing their 
products as well as the manner in which the parties use 
their sales forces to sell their products to consumers. This 
is a fact intensive inquiry. Id. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
17. Simply because large corporations may purchase both Checkpoint 
Systems's physical article security systems and Check Point Software's 
computer security products does not necessarily prove that the same 
security professionals within these corporations have knowledge of these 
different technologies and are responsible for purchasing them. Electronic 
Design & Sales, Inc. v. Electronic Data Sys. Corp. , 954 F.2d 713, 717-18 
(Fed. Cir. 1992) (overlap must exist among individual purchasers). 
 
Here, there is no evidence that a single security expert has sufficient 
knowledge in both the physical security and information security realms 
that he purchases both of these products for his corporation. 
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Here, the District Court found the parties "products are 
advertised in different magazines and are promoted in 
entirely different trade shows." Checkpoint Sys., 104 F. 
Supp. 2d at 466. Checkpoint Systems advertises in trade 
shows and trade publications that are marketed to physical 
and retail security specialists.18 Check Point Software 
advertises in publications and at trade shows that are 
marketed to computer information specialists. As the 
District Court found, 
 
       There is no evidence that plaintiff 's products and 
       defendant's products were offered at the same time in 
       any magazine, trade show, or distribution network. .. . 
       That there is no overlap in the places these parties 
       market their products tends to diminish the chance 
       that someone who is a specialist in network security 
       will even come across an advertisement for plaintiff, 




Additionally, Check Point Software's products are only 
sold to consumers through its "specialized value added 
resellers." These "resellers" do not sell physical article 
security systems. On the other hand, consumers can 
purchase Checkpoint Systems's physical security products 
from its direct mailings and product catalogues or through 
its direct sales force. For these reasons, the District Court 
concluded, "[T]he parties do not market their products 
through the same trade channels or markets, and . . . their 
target customers generally belong to distinctly different 
groups." Id. at 467. We see no clear error. 
 
G. The extent to which targets of the parties' sales 
efforts are the same -- Lapp Factor (8)  
 
We have recognized that when parties target their sales 
efforts to the same consumers, there is a stronger 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
18. While Checkpoint Systems also advertises in security magazines that 
sometimes contain advertisements about computer information security 
(i.e., Security magazine), these magazines are predominantly marketed to 
physical security professionals, and not to information technology 
specialists. 
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likelihood of confusion. Lapp, 721 F.2d at 463-64. This 
analysis too is intensely factual. 
 
The District Court found the parties market their 
products to different users. Checkpoint Systems markets 
its products to physical security consumers. Check Point 
Software markets its products to MIS professionals. Even 
though many companies often purchase both types of 
products, most rely on information specialists to make 
purchasing decisions about network security systems, 
especially since Check Point Software's firewall systems 
must be installed as part of the overall architecture of a 
business's total computer system. But information 
specialists are not essential to make purchasing decisions 
about physical article security systems. 
 
On the basis of this finding, the court concluded there is 
not a strong likelihood that users and consumers of the 
parties' products were likely to come across advertisements 
about the other party's products. The court stated,"That 
there is no overlap in the places these parties market their 
products tends to diminish the chance that someone who is 
a specialist in network security will even come across an 
advertisement for plaintiff, and vice versa." Checkpoint Sys., 
104 F. Supp. 2d at 466. The court did not clearly err in its 
determination. 
 
H. Evidence of Converging markets -- Lapp  Factor (10) 
 
We have held that evidence that the markets in which the 
parties sell their goods are converging is "pivotal in non- 
competing products cases." Lapp, 721 F.2d at 463. "One of 
the chief reasons for granting a trademark owner protection 
in a market not his own is to protect his right someday to 
enter that market. When it appears extremely likely . . . 
that the trademark owner will soon enter the defendant's 
field, this . . . factor weighs heavily in favor of injunctive 
relief." Id. (internal citation omitted). Under this factor we 
look not only to evidence that a plaintiff has actually moved 
into the defendant's market, but also to "other facts 
suggesting that the consuming public might expect the 
prior owner to manufacture a product in the defendant's 
market, or that it is likely to expand into that market." Id. 
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at 463. Evaluating this factor, courts look to evidence that 
other companies sell products in both markets, as well as 
evidence that the products at issue are so closely related 
that the consuming public might find it natural for one 
company to do so. Here, the District Court found the 
physical article security market in which Checkpoint 
Systems sold its products was not converging with the 
computer information security market in which Check Point 
Software sold its firewall products. Nor would consumers 
expect that Checkpoint Systems would naturally expand 
into the network information security market. The court 
stated, "[T]he weight of the evidence indicates that, if 
anything, the fields are diverging as network security 
becomes more and more specialized, and the 
interrelatedness of Internet and intranets becomes more 
complex." Checkpoint Sys., 104 F. Supp. 2d at 452. The 
court noted that some of Checkpoint Systems's competitors 
in the physical article security field had attempted to move 
into the information security field. But these competitors 
had been largely unsuccessful in expanding into this field 
thereby 
 
       undermin[ing] . . . the idea that network security may 
       be within the zone of natural expansion for companies 
       that once had their focus on physical security . . .. 
       Network security . . . is a highly specialized field 
       dominated by companies such as [Check Point 
       Software] which are experts in the intricacies of 
       electronic networks and the techniques of electronic 
       intrusion. Nothing in the record indicates that plaintiff 
       had the requisite expertise or the interest in achieving 
       entry into [Check Point Software's] field. 
 
Id. at 467 n.17. 
 
Checkpoint Systems disputes this finding contending 
that modern security specialists look to purchase network 
security systems that work hand in hand with physical 
security systems. It argues these specialists recognize that 
computer security products are worthless if not physically 
secure. Consumers, they claim, are likely to assume that a 
company that sells products in the physical security 
market is likely to expand into the network security market 
to provide businesses with complete security packages. But 
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the District Court found that the increasingly complex 
market for network security systems requires expertise to 
understand evolving technology. Because of the highly 
specialized and technical nature of network security 
systems, consumers would not likely assume that a 
company that has operated for over 30 years in the distinct 
physical security market would have the expertise to move 
into the complicated network security market. Indeed 
Checkpoint Systems's own security expert witness testified 
that he would turn to a network security professional to 
assist in the purchase of this type of equipment because 
the knowledge required to make an informed purchasing 
decision was highly technical and specialized. Thus, 
although consumers may require security products from 
both the physical security market and the information 
security market, it is reasonable to assume they would turn 
to different companies to purchase these products. 
 
Additionally, there is little evidence that either party 
currently operates in both the physical security and 
network security markets. On appeal, Checkpoint Systems 
points to several of its products, including its physical 
access control systems, its "smart card" technology, its 
radio frequency identification devices, and its closed circuit 
television systems as examples of products that operate in 
both the physical security and network information security 
markets. It contends these products employ similar secure 
network lines to Check Point Software's network security 
technology in order to provide physical article security. But 
even though its products employ some overlapping 
computer technology, Checkpoint Systems's products are 
intended to provide physical article and access security and 
are sold to consumers looking to purchase physical security 
products. Check Point Software's products are sold to 
consumers looking to purchase network information 
security products. The District Court's finding is supported 
by the evidence. We see no clear error. 
 
I. Evidence of actual confusion and the length of time 
the defendant has used the mark without evidence of 
actual confusion -- Lapp Factors (4),(6)  
 
Evidence of actual confusion is not required to prove 
likelihood of confusion. Versa Prods., 50 F.3d at 205; 
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Fisons, 30 F.3d at 476 ("[W]hile evidence of actual 
confusion would strengthen plaintiff 's case, it is not 
essential."). We have recognized that it is difficult to find 
evidence of actual confusion because many instances are 
unreported. For this reason, evidence of actual confusion 
may be highly probative of the likelihood of confusion. 
Frisch's Rests., Inc. v. Elby's Big Boy of Steubenville, Inc., 
670 F.2d 642, 648 n.5 (6th Cir. 1982); see also Tisch 
Hotels, Inc. v. Americana Inn, Inc., 350 F.2d 609, 612 (7th 
Cir. 1965) ("[S]ince reliable evidence of actual confusion is 
difficult to obtain in trademark and unfair competition 
cases, any such evidence is substantial evidence of 
likelihood of confusion."). "If a defendant's product has 
been sold for an appreciable period of time without evidence 
of actual confusion, one can infer that continued marketing 
will not lead to consumer confusion in the future. The 
longer the challenged product has been in use, the stronger 
this inference will be." Versa Prods., 50 F.3d at 205. 
 
Here the District Court found, "Though there is some 
evidence in the record of temporary initial confusion 
between the companies, by experts, the media, investors 
and consumers, there is no evidence of actual customer 
confusion in connection with the purchase of defendant's 
products." Checkpoint Sys., 104 F. Supp. 2d at 447. The 
court continued stating, 
 
       [N]o customer or potential customer for defendant's 
       products has believed, to any meaningful degree, that 
       the products originated with the plaintiff. Conversely, 
       of the few customers of plaintiff, or other persons in 
       the media, who momentarily thought plaintiff might 
       have entered the firewall business, not one took any 
       meaningful action while under that mistaken belief. 
 
Id. at 450. The court concluded, 
 
       Here, there is some evidence of initial confusion by the 
       media and investors when defendant first gained 
       success in the stock market, but that confusion has 
       dissipated, rather than grown, over the years, such 
       that there appears to have been none in the last few 
       years. Moreover, the significance of such initial 
       confusion by the media and investors, like initial 
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       confusion by consumers, lies only in assessing whether 
       it supports the conclusion that confusion in consumer 
       purchasing decision is likely. 
 
Id. at 464.19 
 
On appeal Checkpoint Systems argues the District Court 
erred because it limited its actual confusion inquiry to 
evaluating evidence of consumer confusion at the point of 
sale rather than according weight to evidence of investor 
confusion and other initial interest confusion. It contends 
the Lanham Act affords protection against other types of 
confusion, including initial interest confusion, investor 
confusion and post-sale confusion. 
 
Several courts of appeals have found initial interest 
confusion and post-sale confusion actionable under the 
Lanham Act. We agree and hold initial interest confusion is 
actionable under the Lanham Act. We also hold the District 
Court properly evaluated the evidence of initial interest 
confusion and did not clearly err in finding this evidence 
did not weigh heavily in favor of finding likely confusion. 
We first turn to a discussion of the relevance of initial 




A leading treatise on trademark infringement states: 
 
       [Trademark infringement] can be based upon confusion 
       that creates initial customer interest, even though no 
       actual sale is finally completed as a result of the 
       confusion. 
 
       *  *  * 
 
       [For example,] the likelihood that a potential purchaser 
       of a specialized computer program may be drawn to the 
       junior user, thinking it was the senior user, is 
       actionable "confusion" even if over the course of several 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
19. The court also stated that "plaintiff has not demonstrated that the 
incidents of temporary confusion or other confusion in spheres unrelated 
to purchasing activity is a harbinger of likelihood of confusion in 
purchasing decisions." Checkpoint Sys., 104 F. Supp. 2d at 462. 
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       months of the purchasing decision-making process, the 
       buyer's confusion is dissipated. Such a senior user 
       who is the opposer may suffer injury if a potential 
       purchaser is initially confused between the parties' 
       respective marks in that the opposer may be precluded 
       from further consideration by a potential purchaser in 
       reaching his or her buying decision. 
 
3 McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition,S 23:6 
(internal quotations and footnotes omitted). Several courts 
of appeals, including the Second, Seventh, and Ninth 
Circuits have found initial interest confusion actionable 
under the Lanham Act. In Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus 
Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1987), the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found 
actionable initial interest confusion when it enjoined the 
defendant from using the trade name Pegasus because the 
name was confusingly similar to the plaintiff 's"flying 
horse" mark. The court noted that in the oil industry, 
companies often attract potential consumers by making 
"cold calls" to determine interest in purchasing products. 
The court also noted that on the basis of the similar name 
and mark, it was likely that "Pegasus Petroleum would gain 
crucial credibility during the initial phases of a deal. For 
example, an oil trader might listen to a cold phone call from 
Pegasus Petroleum . . . when otherwise he might not, 
because of the possibility that Pegasus Petroleum is related 
to Mobil." Id. at 259. Because the similar marks could 
ultimately affect a consumer's consideration of the 
defendant's product as well as affect the plaintiff 's goodwill 
with its customers, the court found actionable confusion 
under the Lanham Act. Id. at 260 ("[P]otential purchasers 
would be misled into an initial interest in Pegasus 
Petroleum. Such initial confusion works a sufficient 
trademark injury."); see also Lois Sportswear , 799 F.2d at 
867; Grotrian, Helfferich, Schulz, Th. Steinweg Nachf v. 
Steinway and Sons, 365 F. Supp. 707, 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) 
("Misled into an initial interest, a potential Steinway buyer 
may satisfy himself that the less expensive Grotrian- 
Steinweg is at least as good, if not better, than a Steinway. 
Deception and confusion thus work to appropriate 
[Steinway's] good will."), aff 'd , 523 F.2d 1331 (2d Cir. 
1975). 
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Similarly in Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West 
Coast Entertainment Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1057 (9th Cir. 
1999), the United States Courts of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit recognized that initial interest confusion is 
actionable under the Lanham Act. In Brookfield 
Communications, plaintiffs alleged that defendant West 
Coast Entertainment's use of the web site 
www.moviebuff.com infringed on its "MovieBuff " mark. 
Brookfield used the "MovieBuff " mark on computer 
software that it sold to industry professionals. This software 
contained a searchable database of entertainment related 
data, including information about film release schedules, 
box office receipts, films in development and other 
entertainment news. West Coast's "moviebuff.com" website 
was a free searchable entertainment database that assisted 
its consumers in making educated decisions about the 
rental and purchase of movies. The website also sold movie 
and other entertainment accessories. The court found 
actionable confusion under the Lanham Act reasoning: 
 
       People surfing the Web for information on "MovieBuff " 
       may confuse "MovieBuff " with the searchable 
       entertainment database at "moviebuff.com" and simply 
       assume that they have reached Brookfield's website. 
       . . . Alternatively, they may incorrectly believe that 
       West Coast licensed "MovieBuff " from Brookfield . . . or 
       that Brookfield otherwise sponsored West Coast's 
       database. Other consumers may simply believe that 
       West Coast bought out Brookfield or that they are 
       related companies. 
 
       Yet other forms of confusion are likely to ensue. 
       Consumers may wrongly assume that the "MovieBuff " 
       database they were searching for is no longer offered, 
       having been replaced by West Coast's entertainment 
       database, and thus simply use the services at West 
       Coast's web ste. And even where people realize, 
       immediately upon accessing "moviebuff.com," that they 
       have reached a site operated by West Coast and wholly 
       unrelated to Brookfield, West Coast will still have 
       gained a customer by appropriating the goodwill that 
       Brookfield has developed in its "MovieBuff " mark. A 
       consumer who was originally looking for Brookfield's 
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       products or services may be perfectly content with 
       West Coast's database (especially as it is offered free of 
       charge); but he reached West Coast's site because of its 
       use of Brookfield's mark as its second-level domain 
       name, which is a misappropriation of Brookfield's 
       goodwill by West. 
 
Id. at 1057 (internal citations omitted); see also Interstellar 
Starship Servs., Ltd. v. Epix Inc., 184 F.3d 1107, 1110 (9th 
Cir. 1999) ("We recognize a brand of confusion called `initial 
interest' confusion, which permits a finding of a likelihood 
of confusion although the consumer quickly becomes aware 
of the source's actual identity and no purchase is made as 
a result of the confusion."), cert. denied , 528 U.S. 1155 
(2000); but see Bryce J. Maynard, Note, The Initial Interest 
Confusion Doctrine and Trademark Infringement on the 
Internet, 57 Wash & Lee L. Rev. 1303 (urging caution in 
finding actionable initial interest confusion on the Internet). 
 
In Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188 (5th 
Cir. 1998), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit also recognized initial interest confusion. The court 
there found the plaintiff assignees of the rights of the estate 
of Elvis Presley were entitled to injunctive relief against the 
defendant bar owner's use of the name "The Velvet Elvis" 
because it was likely to create confusion. In finding initial 
interest confusion the court reasoned, 
 
       The witnesses all testified that, upon entering and 
       looking around the [defendants'] bar, they had no 
       doubt that [plaintiff was] not affiliated with it in any 
       way. Despite the confusion being dissipated, this 
       initial-interest confusion is beneficial to the Defendants 
       because it brings patrons in the door; indeed, it 
       brought at least one of the [plaintiff 's] witnesses into 
       the bar. Once in the door, the confusion has succeeded 
       because some of the patrons may stay, despite 
       realizing that the bar has no relationship with 
       [plaintiff]. This initial-interest confusion is even more 
       significant because the Defendants' bar sometimes 
       charges a cover charge for entry, which allows the 
       Defendants to benefit from initial-interest confusion 
       before it can be dissipated by entry into the bar. 
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Id. at 204. 
 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit has equated initial interest confusion to a"bait and 
switch scheme." In Dorr-Oliver, Inc. v. Fluid-Quip, Inc., 94 
F.3d 376, 382 (7th Cir. 1996), the court stated, 
 
       [T]he Lanham Act forbids a competitor from luring 
       potential customers away from a producer by initially 
       passing off its goods as those of the producer's, even if 
       confusion as to the source of the goods is dispelled by 
       the time any sales are consummated. This "bait and 
       switch" of producers, also known as "initial interest" 
       confusion, will affect the buying decisions of 
       consumers in the market for the goods, effectively 
       allowing the competitor to get its foot in the door by 
       confusing consumers. 
 
Id. (internal citation omitted); see also Eli Lilly & Co. v. 
Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456, 464 (7th Cir. 2000) 
("[Initial interest] confusion, which is actionable under the 
Lanham Act, occurs when a consumer is lured to a product 
by its similarity to a known mark, even though the 
consumer realizes the true identity and origin of the 
product before consummating a purchase."). 
 
We join these circuits in holding that initial interest 
confusion is probative of a Lanham Act violation. 20 Without 
initial interest protection, an infringer could use an 
established mark to create confusion as to a product's 
source thereby receiving a "free ride on the goodwill" of the 
established mark. Mobil Oil Corp., 818 F.2d at 260 
(likelihood that "potential purchasers would be misled into 
an initial interest" justifies finding of infringement). 
Confining actionable confusion under the Lanham Act to 
confusion present at the time of purchase would 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
20. We note that several District Courts in our circuit have found initial 
interest confusion probative of a Lanham Act violation. See, e.g., 
Sunquest Info. Sys., Inc. v. Park City Solutions, Inc., 130 F. Supp. 2d 
680, 
695 (W.D. Pa. 2000) ("Although the Third Circuit has not directly 
addressed the issue of initial interest confusion, the doctrine has been 
embraced by numerous courts, including a number of district courts in 
this Circuit."); Acxiom, 27 F. Supp. 2d at 497 ("The court finds that 
there 
is a likelihood of pre-sale confusion."). 
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undervalue the importance of a company's goodwill with its 
customers. 
 
Congress recognized the relevance of initial interest 
confusion and its effect on a company's goodwill when it 
amended the Lanham Act in 1962. In its original form, the 
Lanham Act only applied where the use of similar marks 
was "likely to cause confusion or mistake or to deceive 
purchasers as to the source of origin of such goods or 
services." Esercizio v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235, 1245 (6th 
Cir. 1991) (quoting 1946 Lanham Act.) (emphasis added). In 
1962 Congress deleted the term "purchasers," affording 
Lanham Act protection where a mark is "likely to cause 
confusion or mistake or to deceive." Id. Several courts have 
found the amendment expanded the reach of the Lanham 
Act beyond mere purchasers to recognize pre-sale confusion 
as well as post-sale confusion. See, e.g., id. ("Since 
Congress intended to protect the reputation of the 
manufacturer as well as to protect purchasers, the Act's 
protection is not limited to confusion at the point of sale."); 
Koppers Co. v. Krupp-Koppers GmbH, 517 F. Supp. 836, 
843-44 (W.D. Pa. 1981) (holding Congress intended to 
broaden the scope of protections with the 1962 Amendment 
to the Lanham Act); see also 3 McCarthy on Trademarks & 
Unfair Competition, S 23.7 ("In 1962, Congress struck out 
language in the Lanham Act which required confusion, 
mistake or deception of `purchasers as to the source of 
origin of such goods and services.' Several courts have 
noted this expansion of the test of infringement and held 
that it supports a finding of infringement when even non- 
purchasers are deceived."). We agree with the view that 
Congress's amendment of the Lanham Act in 1962 
expanded trademark protection to include instances in 
which a mark creates initial interest confusion. 21 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
21. The Federal Circuit has interpreted the 1962 amendment to the 
Lanham Act differently. In Elec. Design & Sales, Inc., the court stated, 
 
       The legislative history states that the word "purchasers" was 
deleted 
       because "the provision actually relates to potential purchasers as 
       well as to actual purchasers." Therefore, we do not construe this 
       deletion to suggest, much less compel, that purchaser confusion is 
       no longer the primary focus of the inquiry. Instead, we believe 
that, 
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Check Point Software notes that some circuits have only 
found "initial interest" confusion probative of likely 
confusion when the products at issue are direct 
competitors or where there is a strong interrelatedness 
between the products.22 It claims these circuits have 
recognized that initial interest confusion is probative of a 
Lanham Act violation when the defendant attempts to use 
the plaintiff 's more recognizable mark to "get a foot in the 
door" with potential customers. But if the initial interest 
confusion does not ultimately result in a purchasing 
decision, this factor counsels against finding the likelihood 
of confusion under the Lanham Act.23 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       at least in the case of goods and services that are sold, the 
inquiry 
       generally will turn on whether actual or potential"purchasers" are 
       confused. 
 
954 F.2d at 716 (quoting S. Rep. No. 2107, at 4 (1962), reprinted in 1962 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2844, 2847). 
 
22. Other courts appear to have adopted a facts and circumstances 
approach to evaluating initial interest confusion. BigStar Entm't, Inc. v. 
Next Big Star, Inc., 105 F. Supp. 2d 185, 211 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (declining 
to apply initial interest confusion in the context of an internet case 
involving non-competitors whose web addresses were not identical); 
Northland Ins. Cos. v. Blaylock, 115 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1120 (D.Minn. 
2000) ("Initial interest confusion" exist[s] when the defendant stood to 
materially or financially gain from said initial confusion by trading in 
on 
the value of plaintiff 's mark to initially attract customers."). 
 
23. The disagreement over the use of initial interest confusion is 
highlighted in Esercizio, 944 F.2d at 1249-50. While the majority of the 
court found initial interest confusion generally probative of a Lanham 
Act violation, the dissent noted, 
 
       To be sure, some courts have expanded the application of the 
       likelihood of confusion test to include individuals other than 
point- 
       of-sale purchasers. These courts have included potential purchasers 
       who may contemplate a purchase in the future, reasoning that in 
       the pre-sale context an "observer would identify the [product] with 
       the [original manufacturer], and the [original manufacturer]'s 
       reputation would suffer damage if the [product] appeared to be of 
       poor quality." 
 
       In applying the test in this manner, these courts appear to 
recognize 
       that the deception of a consumer under these circumstances could 
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Some courts have looked at the relatedness of the 
relevant products in evaluating whether initial interest 
confusion is probative of likely confusion. See Hasbro, Inc., 
232 F.3d at 2 ("Certainly in a case involving such disparate 
products and services as this, the court's refusal to enter 
the `initial interest confusion' thicket is well taken given the 
unlikelihood of `legally significant' confusion."); Brookfield 
Communications, 174 F.3d at 1056 (when products are 
unrelated "the likelihood of confusion would probably be 
remote."). Other courts look at evidence that the defendant 
intentionally adopted the plaintiff 's mark to create 
confusion among consumers making purchasing decisions. 
See, e.g., Dorr-Oliver, 94 F.3d at 382-83. Still other courts 
view the level of care consumers exercise in their 
purchasing decisions to determine whether initial interest 
confusion has dissipated prior to a purchasing decision. 
See, e.g., Brookfield Communications, 174 F.3d at 1057 
(finding initial interest confusion actionable because "[I]n 
the Internet context, . . . entering a web site takes little 
effort--usually one click from a linked site or a search 
engine's list; thus, Web surfers are more likely to be 
confused as to the ownership of a web site than traditional 
patrons of a brick-and-mortar store would be of a store's 
ownership."); Rust Env't & Infrastructure, Inc. v. Teunissen, 
131 F.3d 1210, 1217 (7th Cir. 1997) (initial interest 
confusion unlikely with sophisticated consumers). Safeway 
Stores, Inc. v. Safeway Disc. Drugs, 675 F.2d 1160, 1167 
(11th Cir. 1982) ("Short-lived confusion or confusion of 
individuals casually acquainted with a business is worthy 
of little weight."). 
 
Product relatedness and level of care exercised by 
consumers are relevant factors in determining initial 
interest confusion. When products are similar, a firm is 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       dissuade such a consumer from choosing to buy a particular 
       product, thereby foreclosing the possibility of point-of-sale 
confusion 
       but nevertheless injuring the consumer based on this confusion. . . 
. 
       Hence, even when expanding the scope of this test, these courts did 
       not lose sight of the focus of [the inquiry]: the potential 
purchaser. 
 
944 F.2d at 1249-50 (Kennedy J., dissenting) (quoting Polo Fashions, Inc. 
v. Craftex, Inc., 816 F.2d 145, 148 (4th Cir. 1987)). 
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more likely to benefit from the goodwill of a firm with an 
established mark. And when consumers do not exercise a 
high level of care in making their decisions, it is more likely 
that their initial confusion will result in a benefit to the 
alleged infringer from the use of the goodwill of the other 
firm. Conversely, in the absence of these factors, some 
initial confusion will not likely facilitate free riding on the 
goodwill of another mark, or otherwise harm the user 
claiming infringement. Where confusion has little or no 
meaningful effect in the marketplace, it is of little or no 
consequence in our analysis. Nonetheless, we decline to 
issue a blanket rule limiting the probative value of initial 
interest. Its significance will vary, and must be determined 
on a case-by-case basis. As with all cases involving the 
likelihood of confusion under the Lanham Act, courts 
should employ all the relevant Lapp factors and weigh each 
factor to determine whether in the totality of the 
circumstances marketplace confusion is likely. See A&H 




We now turn to whether the District Court properly 
evaluated the evidence of actual confusion, including 
Checkpoint Systems's evidence of initial interest confusion. 
It is undisputed that Checkpoint Systems presented no 
evidence of actual consumer confusion in the form of 
mistaken purchasing decisions. But it presented the 
following evidence of initial interest confusion: (1) e-mails 
that Checkpoint Systems received inquiring about firewall 
products; (2) customer inquiries to Checkpoint Systems 
employees, including its CEO, that expressed an interest in 
purchasing firewalls; (3) service calls made to Checkpoint 
Systems that were intended for Check Point Software; (4) 
misdirected calls to Checkpoint Systems's receptionist that 
were intended for Check Point Software; and (5) reports in 
the media that confused Checkpoint Systems and Check 
Point Software. The District Court found this evidence 
insufficient to support a finding of likely confusion 
reasoning, 
 
       [A]ny evidence by the plaintiff of initial interest 
       confusion by consumers and initial confusion by some 
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       reporters or other observers, is de minimis and weak, 
       and the record is completely devoid of any evidence of 
       an actual mistaken purchase or attempt to purchase 
       one company's products believing they originated with 
       the other company. Especially when viewed in light of 
       the parties' co-existence for over five years, this lack of 
       evidence of any confusion in purchasing decisions of 
       either company's products falls strongly in defendant's 
       favor. 
 
Checkpoint Sys., 104 F. Supp. 2d at 464-65. 
 
On appeal Checkpoint Systems claims the District Court 
erred as a matter of law by requiring it to produce evidence 
of actual consumer confusion in the form of mistaken 
purchasing decisions. It also contends the court erred in 
discounting its evidence of initial interest confusion as de 
minimis. See Tisch Hotels, Inc., 350 F.2d at 612. 
 
But the District Court properly evaluated the evidence of 
initial interest confusion within context of the relevant Lapp 
factors stating, 
 
       This Court does not read [the relevant case law] as 
       holding that the initial interest confusion doctrine is 
       never applicable if the parties are not competitors. 
       However, Hasbro, and numerous other cases, correctly 
       emphasize the importance of the parties' competition or 
       strong interrelatedness. 
 
       A review of the cases which have applied the initial 
       interest doctrine indicates that the parties are either 
       direct competitors, or strongly interrelated such that it 
       could be expected that plaintiff would expand into 
       defendant's market. Other cases have also pointed out 
       that one element of the applicability of the initial 
       interest confusion doctrine is an intent by the 
       defendant to deceive. 
 
Checkpoint Sys., 104 F. Supp. 2d at 462 (citations omitted). 
The court concluded, 
 
       [W]hile evidence of temporary initial interest confusion 
       is not completely irrelevant, such evidence is entitled to 
       less weight than it might be in a case where the parties 
       compete or are strongly interrelated, or where there is 
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       evidence or even an inference that defendant was 
       trying to trade on plaintiff 's goodwill. These factors are 
       utterly absent here. Moreover, the evidence of initial 
       interest confusion in this case is de minimis. 
 
Id. at 462-63. 
 
This is the proper analysis. Checkpoint Systems's and 
Check Point Software's products are unrelated and are sold 
in different markets to consumers who exercise a 
heightened degree of care in making purchasing decisions. 
The markets for the parties' products are not converging, 
nor is there evidence that Check Point Software 
intentionally adopted the Check Point mark to create  
confusion.24 Given these factors, the District Court did not 
clearly err in finding no likelihood of confusion. 
 
Nor did the District Court err in finding the evidence of 
initial interest confusion was de minimis. At oral argument, 
Checkpoint Systems averred that at most there was 
evidence of twenty instances of initial interest confusion 
over the period of time the parties operated in the United 
States. Some of this confusion consisted of misdirected 
calls and therefore it is uncertain whether the consumers 
were confused by the parties' similar names or whether 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
24. Checkpoint Systems's contention that the District Court disregarded 
its initial interest evidence is erroneous. The District Court examined 
this evidence stating, 
 
       The Court acknowledges that evidence of any confusion at all, by 
       investors, purchasers, or the media, may still affect this Court's 
       determination of whether there is a likelihood of confusion by 
       purchasers, for if there is evidence that, for example, the media, 
       whose words purchasers read, is confused about the names of these 
       companies, then it is more likely that purchaser will be confused 
as 
       well. 
 
       *  *  * 
 
       Though that evidence is relevant, here it is minimal, especially 
when 
       contrasted against the glaring absence of evidence of any actual 
       confusion in purchasing decisions in the time that the parties have 
       co-existed, and the incentives to ferret out such confusion during 
       the long pendency of this dispute. . . . 
 
Checkpoint Sys., 104 F. Supp. 2d at 463-64. 
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directory assistance erred in connecting consumers with 
the parties. Duluth News-Tribune v. Mesabi Publ'g Co., 84 
F.3d 1093, 1098 (8th Cir. 1996) (misdirected 
communications are not evidence of confusion where the 
sender knows which party he or she wished to send his 
communication but erred in the delivery of the message). 
Furthermore, the District Court properly took into account 
the potential bias of Checkpoint Systems's employees who 
testified they had been approached by consumers 
interested in Check Point Software's firewall products as 
well as Checkpoint Systems's expert security witnesses who 
testified they erroneously believed that Check Point 
Software was affiliated with Checkpoint Systems. A&H 
Sportswear, 237 F.3d at 227; Reed-Union Corp. v. Turtle 
Wax, Inc., 77 F.3d 909, 911-12 (7th Cir. 1996) (fact finder's 
credibility judgments about confusion testimony are 
virtually never clearly erroneous). 
 
We agree with the District Court that this limited initial 
interest confusion (i.e., the handful of e-mails and other 
anecdotal evidence of mistaken consumer inquiries) was de 
minimis when viewed in light of the length of time the 
parties operated together in the United States25 without 
significant evidence of confusion. Versa Prods. , 50 F.3d at 
205 ("If a defendant's product has been sold for an 
appreciable period of time without evidence of actual 
confusion, one can infer that continued marketing will not 
lead to consumer confusion in the future. The longer the 
challenged product has been in use, the stronger this 
inference will be."); Universal Money Ctrs. v. AT&T, 22 F.3d 
1527, 1535 (10th Cir. 1994) (a few instances of confusion 
over a long period of time are insufficient to support a 
finding of confusion); Barre-National, Inc. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 
773 F. Supp. 735, 744 (D.N.J. 1991) ("Use of similar marks 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
25. Check Point Software has sold its products in the United States since 
late 1994. While its products were not widely circulated until late 1996, 
its products were co-branded with Sun MicroSystems products from 
1995-1996 in order to promote the Check Point Software mark. 
Therefore the District Court did not err when it stated "when viewed in 
light of the parties' co-existence for over five years, this lack of 
[actual 
confusion] evidence . . . falls strongly in defendant's favor." Checkpoint 
Sys., 104 F. Supp. 2d at 465. 
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for a substantial period of time with no confusion among 
consumers may create a presumption that there is little 
likelihood of confusion."). Nor were the isolated instances of 
confusion in the media probative of likely confusion. 
Centaur Communications, Ltd. v. A/S/M Communications, 
Inc., 830 F.2d 1217, 1227 (2d Cir. 1987) (newspaper mis- 
attributions were isolated incidents not probative of actual 
confusion). Given the size of these companies, and the large 
number of e-mails, customer inquiries, and other 
communications they receive on a daily basis, these 
isolated instances of initial interest confusion counsel 
against a finding of likely confusion. A&H Sportswear, 237 
F. 3d at 227 ("isolated" instances of confusion insufficient 
to support finding of likely confusion); Scott Paper Co., 589 
F.2d at 1231 (nineteen misdirected letters over four years 
weighed against finding of confusion); Nippondenso Co. v. 
Denso Distribs., Civ. No. 86-3982, 1987 WL 10703 at *5 
(E.D. Pa. May 11, 1987) ("The weight attributed to 
instances of actual confusion depends to some extent upon 
the circumstances of the case, including the volume of 
sales of the goods involved. If isolated instances of actual 
confusion result from the sale of a substantial number of 
goods, the weight given to the evidence of actual confusion 
is markedly reduced.") (citing Scott Paper Co., 589 F. 2d at 




On appeal, Checkpoint Systems contends the District 
Court erred in evaluating evidence of investor confusion. 
While a handful of district courts have found evidence of 
investor confusion probative of a Lanham Act violation, see, 
e.g., Acxiom Corp. v. Axiom, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 2d 478 (D. 
Del. 1998); Koppers Co. v. Krupp-Koppers GmbH , 517 F. 
Supp. 836 (W.D. Pa. 1981), no appellate court has yet so 
held. 
 
In Acxiom, the district court held that"investor confusion 
may be considered by the trial court as part of its 
application of the Lapp factors." 27 F. Supp. 2d at 501. In 
support of its likelihood of confusion claim, plaintiff in that 
case presented evidence of two investors and a potential 
investor who testified that they were confused by the 
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similar names. The court held this evidence counseled in 
favor of finding likely confusion. It reached this conclusion 
on the basis of its view that the 1962 amendment to the 
Lanham Act evinced "a clear congressional intent to `outlaw 
the use of trademarks which are likely to cause confusion, 
mistake, or deception of any kind, not merely of purchasers 
nor simply as to source of origin.' " Id.  at 501 (quoting 
Koppers, 517 F. Supp. at 843-45). 
 
Checkpoint Systems contends investor confusion is 
probative of the likelihood of confusion and the District 
Court erred in discounting this evidence. But given the 
parties limited briefing on this issue as well as the scant 
evidence of investor confusion here,26  we will reserve 
decision on this issue. We make a few observations 
nonetheless. Arguably, the 1962 amendments to the 
Lanham Act extended actionable confusion beyond 
purchasers to other instances affecting a party's business 
or goodwill. Investor confusion may well threaten a party's 
business or goodwill if it would likely deter or inhibit a 
company's ability to attract investors and raise capital. 
 
Here it seems unlikely that investors would be confused 
by the parties' similar marks or somewhat similar stock 
symbols ("CKP" and "CHKP" for Checkpoint Systems and 
Check Point Software, respectively). Many investors are 
sophisticated parties who exercise a high degree of care in 
making investment decisions. Also, the parties' shares are 
traded on different exchanges (Checkpoint Systems's stock 
is traded on the New York Stock Exchange and Check Point 
Software's stock is traded on the NASDAQ). Given the 
paucity of evidence of investor confusion here, it is 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
26. Checkpoint Systems presented the following evidence of investor 
confusion: (1) financial reports and analyses that confused Checkpoint 
Systems's and Check Point Software's stock symbols; and (2) two 
investors and one potential investor who were initially confused by 
mistaken media reports about the parties' stocks. But these investors 
averred that they quickly realized their mistake and did not make any 
investment decision based on their mistake. Their confusion was an 
isolated example of confusion when compared to the large number of 
investors in both companies. Homeowners Group, Inc., 932 F.2d at 1110 
(existence of only a "handful" of instances of confusion leads to 
inference 
that confusion is unlikely). 
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unnecessary to resolve the issue here, and we believe it is 
prudent to reserve judgment at this time.27 Cf. Hoover Co. 
v. Citicorp Venture Capital Ltd., 674 F. Supp. 460, 461 
(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (finding no Lanham Act violation where 
there was "only scant evidence of investor confusion in 
connection with a single advertisement for a securities 
offering."). 
 
J. Totality of Lapp Factors 
 
The District did not err in its factual findings nor in its 
application of the individual Lapp factors to those findings. 
Furthermore, the District Court's conclusion that the 
combination of the Lapp factors do not establish 
substantial likelihood of confusion in the marketplace is 
consistent with its findings. Even though mark similarity-- 
a factor favorable to Checkpoint Systems--is ordinarily the 
most important element in the multi-factor Lapp  analysis, 
it is not necessarily determinative, especially where, as 
here, the markets for competing marks are highly distinct. 
Because Checkpoint Systems's and Check Point Software's 
products are not related, and are marketed to different 
consumers through different channels, the evidence 
demonstrates it is unlikely the relevant consumers, who 
exercise a high degree of care in purchasing and selecting 
among these products, were likely to be confused by the 
marks. Additionally, there is no evidence that Check Point 
Software intended to use its mark to gain a competitive 
advantage. Also, the evidence supports the District Court's 
finding that the markets are unlikely to converge in the 
future. The minimal evidence of actual initial interest 
confusion is insufficient to override this conclusion. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
27. We note that the District Court did not completely disregard the 
evidence of investor confusion Checkpoint Systems presented stating, 
 
       The Court acknowledges that evidence of any confusion at all, by 
       investors, purchasers, or the media, may still affect this Court's 
       determination of whether there is a likelihood of confusion . . . 
 
       *  *  * 
 
       Though that evidence is relevant, here it is minimal. . . . 
 
Checkpoint Sys., 104 F. Supp. 2d at 463-64. 
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Because the District Court did not clearly err in its 
application of the Lapp factors--individually and in 
combination--we will affirm its holding there was no 
likelihood of (direct) marketplace confusion. See A&H 
Sportswear, 237 F.3d at 237 ("The question of likelihood of 
confusion is ultimately one of fact, and [the appellate court] 







On appeal, Checkpoint Systems challenges the District 
Court's analysis of its "reverse confusion" claim, contending 
the mark of Check Point Software (the junior user) has 
become so strong in the relevant market that the 
consuming public might assume that Check Point Software 
is actually the source of the products of Checkpoint 
Systems (the senior user). 
 
In Fisons, 30 F.3d at 475, we expressly recognized a 
cause of action for reverse confusion, stating, 
 
       Ordinarily, one expects that the new or junior user of 
       the mark will use to its advantage the reputation and 
       good will of the senior user by adopting a similar or 
       identical mark. Reverse confusion occurs when a 
       larger, more powerful company uses the trademark of 
       a smaller, less powerful senior owner and thereby 
       causes likely confusion as to the source of the senior 
       user's goods and services. 
 




28. In a reverse confusion situation, 
 
       the junior user saturates the market with a similar trademark and 
       overwhelms the senior user. The public comes to assume the senior 
       user's products are really the junior user's or that the former has 
       become somehow connected to the latter. The result is that the 
       senior user loses the value of the trademark--its product identity, 
       corporate identity, control over its goodwill and reputation, and 
       ability to move into new markets. 
 
Ameritech, Inc. v. Am. Info. Techs. Corp., 811 F.2d 960, 964 (6th Cir. 
1987). 
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Courts have recognized that "failure to recognize reverse 
confusion would essentially immunize from unfair 
competition liability companies that have well established 
trade names and the financial ability to advertise a senior 
mark taken from smaller, less powerful competitors." 
Harlem Wizards, 952 F. Supp. at 1091-92 (citing Big O Tire 
Dealers, Inc., v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 561 F.2d 
1365, 1372 (10th Cir. 1977); see also Dreamwerks , 142 
F.3d at 1130. "Were reverse confusion not a sufficient basis 
to obtain Lanham Act protection, a larger company could 
with impunity infringe the senior mark of a smaller one." 
Fisons, 30 F.3d at 475. 
 
In a direct confusion case, the consuming public may 
assume that the established, senior user is the source of 
the junior user's goods. In a reverse confusion case, the 
consuming public may assume the converse; that is, that 
the junior, but more powerful, mark user is the source of 
the senior user's products. The harm to the senior user is 
not just that its goodwill is appropriated, but that the value 
of its mark is diminished. The fundamental issue in both 
cases, however, is essentially the same: whether the 
consuming public is likely to be confused about the source 
of products of the respective mark users. 
 
In A&H Sportswear, we held that in a typical reverse 
confusion case, courts should employ the same Lapp 
factors in assessing likelihood of confusion.29 But in a 
reverse confusion case, some of the Lapp factors must be 
analyzed differently.30 The strength of the parties' marks, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
29. In reaching that conclusion, we rejected the notion that courts 
should apply a threshold test to determine whether a junior user has 
used its economic power to saturate the market in reverse confusion 
cases. The proper inquiry is to apply all of the relevant Lapp factors. 
A&H Sportswear, 237 F.3d at 208. 
 
30. In A&H Sportswear, we noted that the application of the following 
Lapp factors is typically the same in both types of claims: (1) 
sophistication and attentiveness of consumers; (2) the degree to which 
the channels of trade and advertisement overlap; (3) the similarity of the 
targets of the parties' sales efforts; and (4) the similarity of the 
products 
themselves. We also noted that absent the presence of housemarks and 
disclaimers, the similarity of marks factor should generally be examined 
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the intent in adopting the marks,31 and the evidence of 
actual confusion are analyzed differently from the method 
employed in a typical direct confusion case. A&H 
Sportswear, 237 F.3d at 236. On appeal, Checkpoint 
Systems argues the District Court did not follow the 
analysis of actual confusion and strength of mark outlined 
in A&H Sportswear.32 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
in a similar fashion in both direct and reverse confusion cases. As 
discussed at length, the District Court properly applied these factors and 
found that there was no likelihood of confusion. A&H Sportswear, 237 
F.3d at 236 ("[T]he factors concerning the market, sales, and function 
similarity . . . need not be reexamined for the reverse confusion claim 
because the District Court has already discussed them in connection 
with direct confusion and there is typically no difference in the analysis 
of these factors for reverse and direct confusion claims."). We see no 
error. 
 
31. Neither party disputes the District Court's analysis of the intent of 
the parties in adopting the marks. 
 
32. Additionally, plaintiff argues the District Court improperly held that 
a claim for reverse confusion is only actionable when the parties' 
products directly compete. But the District Court did not state this 
proposition. Rather, the court stated 
 
       reverse confusion threatens harm when the junior user `overwhelms' 
       the marketplace such that the senior user begins to lose its 
identity 
       and profile. This concern is of greatest force with competing or 
       related products. In the present case, involving non-competing, 
       unrelated products, such "overwhelming" has not even remotely 
       occurred. 
 
Checkpoint Sys., 104 F. Supp. 2d at 461. 
 
The proper inquiry in a reverse confusion claim is whether consumers 
will assume the senior user's goods are associated with the junior user. 
Just as in a direct confusion claim, the relatedness of the parties' 
products is integral to the finding of likely confusion. If two products 
are 
unrelated, there is little reason to assume confusion since most 
consumers would not assume that a single company would market two 
completely unrelated products. On the other hand, when the goods are 
related, a customer might reasonably assume the junior user with a 
strong market presence would sell both products. Fisons, 30 F.3d at 481 
("The question is whether the consumer might therefore reasonably 
conclude that one company would offer both of these related products."). 
 





In a typical direct confusion claim, the stronger the 
senior user's mark, the greater the likelihood of confusion 
caused by a junior user's use of a similar mark. But in a 
reverse confusion situation, the senior user's claim may be 
strengthened by a showing that the junior user's mark is 
commercially relatively strong. The greater relative strength 
of the junior mark allows the junior user to "overwhelm" 
the marketplace, diminishing the value of the senior user's 
mark. While analysis of the strength of the senior user's 
mark is relevant, the more important inquiry focuses on the 
junior user's mark. "[T]he lack of commercial strength of 
the smaller senior user's mark is to be given less weight in 
the analysis because it is the strength of the larger, junior 
user's mark which results in reverse confusion.' " A&H 
Sportswear, 237 F.3d at 231 (quoting Commerce Nat'l Ins. 
Servs., Inc., 214 F.3d at 444). Courts should look at the 
commercial strength of the junior user's mark to determine 
whether its advertising and marketing has resulted in a 
"saturation in the public awareness of the junior user's 
mark." Id., 237 F.3d at 231. 
 
Checkpoint Systems contends the District Court 
improperly evaluated the strength of the marks. Because 
the court found its mark weak in the electronic access 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
The District Court recognized that consumers of Check Point 
Software's highly sophisticated technical computer security systems 
would have no reason to believe that Checkpoint Systems's physical 
article surveillance system was manufactured by Check Point Software. 
Because the "computer information" niche that Check Point Software 
operated in was unique and technical there is no reason to believe a 
consumer would assume that Check Point Software had expanded into 
the market for a different type of security product. The same is true of 
Checkpoint Systems's customers. Because of the complicated technology 
involved in the "computer information" niche, these customers would not 
assume that Checkpoint Systems had moved into this market. The court 
properly recognized that even though the relevant case law does not 
require directly competing goods in order to find reverse confusion, 
product relatedness is a very important factor to finding that a consumer 
might confuse the source of products. See, e.g. , id.; Scott Paper, 589 
F.2d at 1230. We see no error. 
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control products (the product most similar to Check Point 
Software's firewall technology),33 and by inference that 
Check Point Software's mark was relatively strong in that 
market, plaintiffs claim the court should have found 
actionable reverse confusion. In other words, as a stronger 
junior user in the network information security market, 
Check Point Software's mark allegedly overwhelmed 
Checkpoint Systems's senior, but weaker mark in the 
relevant market. 
 
Unlike its other findings, the District Court did not 
scrutinize the reverse confusion claim, perhaps because it 
was not extensively argued. It did not expressly analyze the 
relative strengths of the marks for purposes of this claim, 
nor did it directly examine the strength of Check Point 
Software's mark. As noted, it is the strength of the junior 
user's mark that is crucial in establishing a reverse 
confusion claim, because it is the strength of its mark that 
might lead consumers to mistakenly identify "Checkpoint"- 
labeled products with Check Point Software. A&H 
Sportswear, 237 F.3d at 231). In its limited discussion of 
the reverse discrimination claim, the court stated, 
 
       [R]everse confusion threatens harm when the junior 
       user "overwhelms" the marketplace such that the 
       senior user begins to lose its identity and profile. This 
       concern is of greatest force with competing or related 
       products. In the present case, involving non-competing, 
       unrelated products, such "overwhelming" has not even 
       remotely occurred. 
 
Checkpoint Sys., 104 F. Supp. 2d at 461. 
 
Had the District Court the benefit of our recent opinion 
in A&H Sportswear , it doubtless would have been guided 
by our analysis. But its failure to do so does not require 
reversal. In light of its Lapp-factors findings, a focused 
analysis under A&H Sportswear could not have changed 
the court's conclusion of no reverse confusion. 
 
The District Court properly noted that reverse confusion 
is most likely in cases involving competing or related 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
33. The court found that its mark was strong in the physical article 
surveillance market. 
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products. When products are related, consumers may be 
likely to assume they are produced by the same company. 
But when not related, the likelihood of confusion 
diminishes dramatically. Given the strong distinctiveness of 
the respective markets as found by the District Court, any 
confusion would appear unlikely. For this reason, a focused 
analysis of the strength of Check Point Software's mark 
would not affect the court's conclusion. 
 
To establish a claim of reverse confusion, there must be 
evidence that consumers of Checkpoint Systems's products 
were likely to assume that Check Point Software was the 
source of those products. See Dreamwerks, 142 F.3d at 
1130 ("The question . . . is whether consumers doing 
business with the senior user might mistakenly believe that 
they are dealing with the junior user."). But as noted, the 
court found the decision makers who purchased 
Checkpoint Systems's products were not likely to be the 
target audience of Check Point Software's advertising or 
marketing. See Checkpoint Sys., 104 F. Supp. 2d at 466 
("That there is no overlap in the places these parties market 
their products tends to diminish the chance that someone 
who is a specialist in network security will even come 
across an advertisement for plaintiff, and vice versa."). And 
even if purchasers received such marketing materials, the 
high level of care with which they ordinarily made their 
purchasing decisions substantially lessened the likelihood 
of confusion. Put another way, the strength of Check 
Point's Software's mark within the corporate information 
security market would not likely affect the consumers 
within Checkpoint Systems's market, given the level of 
distinctiveness of the relevant markets found by the District 
Court. 
 
In light of these findings, the strength of Check Point 
Software's mark could have a determinative effect on the 
outcome of the reverse confusion analysis, if at all, only if 
extremely powerful. Only then could it "overwhelm" the 
marketplace diminishing the value of Checkpoint Systems's 
mark. Although the District Court did not analyze this 
factor, it was correct in finding that, "[i]n the present case, 
involving non-competing, unrelated products, such 
`overwhelming' has not even remotely occurred." Checkpoint 
Sys., 104 F. Supp. 2d at 461. 
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As we held in Fisons, the court's application of the Lapp 
factors is not mechanical; rather it must weigh each factor 
against the others. 30 F.3d at 473. When the reviewing 
court determines that almost all the relevant factors favor 
one party, it may discount one factor. See, e.g. , Jet, Inc. v. 
Sewage Aeration Sys., 165 F.3d 419, 423 (6th Cir. 1999) 
(finding no reversible error when the district court erred in 
its application of the "converging markets" factor but 
correctly applied other factors); Freedom Sav. and Loan 
Ass'n v. Way, 757 F.2d 1176, 1186 (11th Cir. 1985) 
(finding no reversible error where District Court erred in its 
application of the "similarity of products or services" factor 





Checkpoint Systems also contends the District Court 
erred in its evaluation of the evidence of actual confusion in 
its reverse confusion claim. In A&H Sportswear , we stated 
that in most trademark cases, parties allege both direct and 
reverse confusion since "the manifestation of consumer 
confusion as `direct' or `reverse' may merely be a function of 
the context in which the consumer first encountered the 
mark. Isolated instances of `direct' confusion may occur in 
a reverse confusion case, and vice-versa." 237 F.3d at 233. 
We declined "to create a strict bar to the use of`direct' 
confusion evidence in a `reverse' confusion case, or vice 
versa." Id.34 Under this view, evidence that the public 
thought Check Point Software was the origin of Checkpoint 
Systems's products is just as probative of likely confusion 
as evidence that the public thought Checkpoint Systems 
was the origin of Check Point Software's products. 35 Here, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
34. We noted that "as a matter of intuition" one might assume evidence 
that the public thought that the senior user was the origin of the junior 
users products would support a direct confusion claim while evidence 
that the public thought the junior user was the source of the senior 
user's product would support a reverse confusion claim. But we stated, 
"In our view, if we were to create a rigid division between `direct' and 
`reverse' confusion evidence, we would run the risk of denying recovery 
to meritorious plaintiffs." A&H Sportswear , 237 F.3d at 233. 
 
35. However, we noted in A&H Sportswear that "evidence working in the 
same direction as the claim is preferred, and `misfitting' evidence must 
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the District Court properly examined the evidence of actual 
confusion36 and found it to be de minimis. We see no error. 
 
Finally, Checkpoint Systems contends the District Court 
erred in requiring evidence of actual confusion of 
purchasers at the point of sale to prove its reverse 
confusion claim. But as we have discussed, plaintiffs have 
mischaracterized the court's analysis. The court factored 
Checkpoint Systems's evidence of initial interest and 
investor confusion into its confusion analysis but found the 




For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of 
the District Court. 
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be treated carefully, for large amounts of one type of confusion in a 
claim for a different type may in fact work against the plaintiff." 237 
F.3d 
at 233. Here the court found minimal evidence supporting both 
Checkpoint Systems's direct and reverse confusion claims. 
 
36. The District Court stated: 
 
       Though plaintiff did have incentive and ability to find [instances 
of 
       actual] confusion if it occurred, by asking its sales persons, 
       distributors, and customers, [Checkpoint Systems] did not offer any 
       testimony of a confused purchaser at trial, showing an absence of 
       reverse confusion (i.e., where a [Checkpoint Systems] customer 
       seeks to purchase a [Checkpoint Systems] product because the 
       customer believes it originated from [Check Point Software]). 
       Similarly, plaintiff located no [Check Point Software] customers 
who 
       indicated they became interested in a [Check Point Software] 
       product because they thought it originated from[Checkpoint 
       Systems]. 
 
Checkpoint Sys., 104 F. Supp. 2d at 464 (internal citations omitted). 
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